Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Forensic Investigation Process: DJI Phantom 3 Drone As a Case Study by Roder, Alan et al.
Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law 2018 Proceedings 
May 17th, 10:40 AM - 11:15 AM 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Forensic Investigation Process: DJI 
Phantom 3 Drone As a Case Study 
Alan Roder 
alan.roder@ucdconnect.ie 
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo 
University of Texas at San Antonio, raymond.choo@fulbrightmail.org 
Nhien-A Le-Khac 
University College Dublin, Ireland, an.lekhac@ucd.ie 
(c)ADFSL 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl 
 Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, Computer Law Commons, Defense and Security 
Studies Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, Information Security Commons, 
National Security Law Commons, OS and Networks Commons, Other Computer Sciences Commons, and 
the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Roder, Alan; Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond; and Le-Khac, Nhien-A, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Forensic 
Investigation Process: DJI Phantom 3 Drone As a Case Study" (2018). Annual ADFSL Conference on 
Digital Forensics, Security and Law. 1. 
https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2018/presentations/1 
This Peer Reviewed Paper is brought to you for free and 
open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Annual ADFSL 
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law by an 
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
  
                                                          
1 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Forensic ... CDFSL Proceedings 2018 
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE FORENSIC 
INVESTIGATION PROCESS: DJI PHANTOM 3 
DRONE AS A CASE STUDY1 
Alan Roder 
alan.roder@ucdconnect.ie 
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo 
Department of Information Systems and Cyber Security, University of Texas at San Antonio, TX 
78258, USA 
raymond.choo@fulbrightmail.org 
Nhien-An Le-Khac 
School of Computer Science, University College Dublin, Ireland 
an.lekhac@ucd.ie 
ABSTRACT 
Drones (also known as 'Unmanned Aerial Vehicles' - UAVs) are a potential source of evidence in a 
digital investigation, partly due to their increasing popularity in our society. However, existing 
UAV / drone forensics generally rely on conventional digital forensic investigation guidelines such as 
those of ACPO and NIST, which may not be entirely fit-for-purpose. In this paper, we identify the 
challenges associated with UAV / drone forensics. We then explore and evaluate existing forensic 
guidelines, in terms of their effectiveness for UAV / drone forensic investigations. Next, we present 
our set of guidelines for UAV / drone investigations. Finally, we demonstrate how the proposed 
guidelines can be used to guide a drone forensic investigation using the DJI Phantom 3 drone as a 
case study. 
Keywords: Drone forensics, UAV forensics, forensic challenges, forensic guideline, forensic case 
study 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Drones, also referred to as 'Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles' (UAVs) in the literature, can be 
loosely defined as an aircraft piloted by remote 
control or an on-board computer. There are a 
wide range of UAVs, in terms of capabilities and 
prices. Such U AV s are also designed for use in 
different environments, such as security, 
disaster response ( e.g. rescue missions) , 
mapping, and adversarial settings ( e.g. 
battlefields). 
Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this paper in order to describe 
an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply 
recommendation or endorsement by the authors or their institutions, nor is it intended to imply that the 
entities, materials , or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 
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U AV s can be considered as part of the 
broader Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), which 
encompasses UAV, Ground Control Station 
(GCS) and Controller. These parts are 
necessary to successfully, remotely and 
accurately control a UAV. 
In recent years, UAVs have been 
increasingly popular among consumers and the 
research community. For example, the global 
market revenue for drones is expected to surpass 
$11.2 billion by the year 2020, according to a 
report from Gartner [1]. With so many drones 
purchased for home and personal use, the 
potential for drones to be involved in a digital 
(forensic) investigation will undoubtedly 
increase. For example, it was posited that 
vulnerabilities in driverless vehicles may be 
exploited by criminals, particularly terrorists , to 
facilitate criminal or terrorist attacks in the 
physical world [2]. The same can be said for 
drones [7] . 
U AV forensics is relatively less studied, in 
comparison to other popular consumer devices 
and technologies such as mobile devices ( e.g. 
Android, iOS , and Windows Phones) , cloud 
computing, edge computing, and fog computing 
[25]. 
In 2015, Kovar [3] highlighted the essential 
elements akin to U AV forensics and detailed the 
process of obtaining data from the popular DJI 
Phantom 2. A year later in 2016, Kovar, 
Dominguez and Murphy [4] extended the prior 
work in [3] to include a forensic examination of 
a DJI Phantom 3. Along a similar line, Horsman 
[5] conducted a forensic investigation of Parrot 
Bebop UAV, and Clark et al. [8] presented their 
findings of a Phantom 3 U AV forensic 
examination. 
On the other hand, more than a decade ago 
in 2007, the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) published 'The ACPO principles for 
obtaining digital evidence [10] .' In the same 
year, the National Institute for Science and 
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Technology (NIST) published the 'Guidelines 
on Mobile Device Forensics [11] '; Existing UAV 
forensic approaches are generally based on 
ACPO and NIST guidelines ( or their variations). 
This is not surprising, as there is no published 
guideline designed for UAV forensics. 
Hence, in this research, we review existing 
(U AV) forensic literature and potential data 
storage locations. In our review, we highlight 
the limitations in existing guidelines, and the 
need for a guideline dedicated to U AV forensics. 
Thus, we propose in this paper a forensic process 
focused on U AV investigations. This process is 
designed to guide the investigation process when 
examining U AV s. 
We then evaluate the proposed process 
using a drone as a case study, and specifically a 
DJI Phantom 3 drone. 
The rest of this paper is structured as 
follows: in the next section, we discuss U AV 
forensic challenges and briefly review existing 
forensic guidelines in the context of U AV 
forensics. We present our U AV forensic process 
in Section 3, and the case study in Section 4. 
We conclude and discuss future work in Section 
5. 
2. UA V FORENSIC 
CHALLENGES 
U AV forensic and security examinations have 
been undertaken by U AV enthusiasts and the 
fan communities. For example, a number of 
them have created their own ( often freely 
available) software, which can interpret the 
data files stored on the U AV s. One such 
example is DatCon, a tool designed to interpret 
.DAT files specifically from DJI UAVs [9]. 
While these tools are a valuable pool of 
knowledge, such tools are unlikely to have been 
validated according to forensic requirements. In 
other words, these tools are unlikely to be 
forensically sound and artifacts obtained from 
using such tools may be inadmissible in a court 
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of law. Thus, there is a need for forensic 
validation work to be undertaken by the digital 
forensic community. 
In addition to the diversity / variation in 
UAV products, it is understandable that the 
existing forensic examination guidelines may 
not be appropriate or sufficient. For instance, 
the ACPO principles for obtaining digital 
evidence [10] and NIST Guidelines for mobile 
phone forensics [11] were both published in 
2007, and these guidelines may not have kept 
pace with technological advances. 
In the context of UAVs or UAS, for 
example, data can be stored in several locations, 
such as the UAV, GCS, network routers, and so 
on. Storage locations can also be overt or covert, 
and one also needs to note that in some 
instances, there are in-built persistent storage 
media such as Micro SD cards [12]. There is also 
the likelihood of the recovery of artifacts from 
flash storage, which typically require some form 
of direct connection [24]. We would also have to 
take into consideration the likelihood that a 
U AV used in a criminal activity has been 
modified to either hinder forensic investigation 
or enhance certain features such as increased 
load carrying capacity ( e.g. in drug smuggling 
activities across borders, or act as an improvised 
explosive device). 
As previously discussed, there are a number 
of existing digital forensic guidelines. When the 
ACPO principles [10] were created, it was an 
attempt to standardise what was then a 
relatively new field of forensic study. The four 
ACPO principles were generalised so that they 
are technologically neutral. However, it is 
important to note the key concept underpinning 
these principles is to ensure the integrity of the 
original data. This clearly applies to UAV and 
any forms of digital forensics. 
There are also similarities between UAV and 
mobile device forensics [26]. For example, 
similar to a mobile device, a modern or 
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advanced GCS is likely to have Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth, or Internet connection. Therefore, 
there is a possibility that the device could be 
remotely wiped or modified. UAV forensics can 
also involve conventional storage media 
forensics [24] ( e.g. memory cards are copied) and 
live forensics (e.g. real-time access to a live UAV 
to view data stored on flash memory). Since 
most U AV s do not have a graphical user 
interface (GUI) or inbuilt interface, there is a 
real-risk that data may have been changed 
without the knowledge of the forensic 
examiner / investigator. Thus, consideration 
must be given at this level of examination, and 
while deciding the order of investigation one 
needs to minimise any potential for data 
modification. Since checking of U AV flash 
memory requires a live interaction, it is unlikely 
that any two examinations will achieve the same 
result. 
Whilst existing literature is useful to guide 
a general forensic investigation of a UAV, 
having a UAV focused / specific forensic process 
could be more useful to forensic 
examiners/ investigators ( e.g. to maintain 
consistency across cases). 
3. PROPOSED UAV 
FORENSIC 
INVESTIGATION 
PROCESS 
In this section, we first determine if there are 
any differences between digital storage 
locations, when compared to traditional 
computer/ mobile forensics. Next, we propose a 
new forensic investigation process for UAV. 
3 .1 UA V data. storage location 
In many ways, the storage locations for UAVs 
share similarities with mobile devices. UAV 
storage locations vary, but the medium used to 
store data is primarily either a Micro SD card 
or flash memory. This seems to be an over 
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simplification given the constant evolution and 
advances in related technologies. For example, 
older mobile devices relied upon flash storage for 
operating system (OS) storage and Micro SD 
cards for additional storage. Since 2015, most 
mobile devices use flash storage. Given the 
demand for UAVs to become more efficient, it 
seems likely that they will follow a similar 
technological trend to mobile devices. 
At the time of this research, popular 
commercial U AV s provide OS via flash storage 
or Micro SD card, with a separate Micro SD 
card for video footage. This flexibility allows the 
base UAV cost to remain low, whilst allowing 
upgrades to storage at the owner's expense. 
Since there is demand for U AV s to remain in 
flight for longer periods of time, and to provide 
increased 4K support for video capture, the 
likelihood that flash storage will become an 
option (similar to Apple's graded internal 
storage pricing) becomes more likely. 
A more significant variance between U AV s 
and mobile devices is the inherent adaptability 
and modular nature of UAVs. UAVs can store 
data in different locations such as the U AV, 
GCS, and other mobile devices used to 
connect / pilot the UAVs. Flight log data is often 
stored in a single location; however, media files 
are often found in multiple locations , usually in 
different resolutions. 
Investigation on the data obtained from 
mobile devices , laptops and personal computers 
usually incorporate elements of registration 
information, such as email addresses, usernames 
and payment plans. Since UAVs traditionally 
do not require registration or payment plans 
[13], this further dilutes the association between 
the device and the operator. 
3. 2 Proposed process 
Now we describe our UAV forensic 
investigation process step-by-step, using a case 
study for illustration. In our process, there are 
three main stages, namely: preparation, 
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examination and analysis/ report. The first stage 
includes Steps 1 to 6. Steps 7 to 17 are part of 
the second stage, and the final stage includes 
Steps 18 to 20. 
Step 1 - Identify and determine the chain of 
command 
Relevant questions to consider are as 
follows: 
1. How is the exhibit seized? For example , 
has a tamperproof evidential 
container / bag been used, and have 
photographs been taken of the exhibit? 
2. Has consideration been given to 
electronically isolating the exhibit ( e.g. 
the use of Faraday box/ cage)? 
3. Does the container state the exhibit 
reference? 
4. Does the container name the seizing 
officer or exhibitor? 
5. Does the container have a unique 
reference number? 
6. Does the container state when and 
where the exhibit was seized? 
7. Does the container have sufficient space 
to sign your name? 
The above questions are not an exhaustive 
list of considerations and should be adapted 
based on the situation, and the guidelines and 
rules of the investigation authority. As with any 
forensic examination, if the credibility of the 
exhibit cannot be maintained, its evidential 
usefulness will become limited. If the exhibit 
continuity is weak, then it creates an element of 
doubt in the admissibility of the evidence and a 
potential for the defence team to discredit part 
or all of the evidence obtained. 
It is often the case that the U AV will be 
seized first ( e.g. due to device failure or pilot 
error). Should data relevant to the case be 
obtained, there may be a lag between when the 
U AV was seized and when the warrant or arrest 
was executed. Should a GCS be found during 
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the search process, it will need to be examined 
to determine if it is linked to the UAV. 
Due to the inherent remote access associated 
with UAVs, consideration must be given to 
network isolation. It may be safer, cheaper and 
more practical to switch off the U AV at the 
point of seizure. However, since there does not 
appear to be a standard OS across the wide 
range of U AV s, consideration must be given to 
how data is stored and what effect this will 
have. 
Step 2 - Have conventional forensic 
practices (e.g . DNA , fingerprints, and ballistic) 
already been implemented? 
Digital evidence can also be supported by 
traditional evidence such as witness statements. 
For example, fingerprints and other DNA 
materials found on a U AV can also be used as 
supporting evidence in the investigation. 
Step 3-Identify the role of the device in 
conducting the offence (Offence analysis) 
This step includes two important tasks, 
namely: (i) Review the case investigation notes 
to determine how and why this device was used 
during the commission of the offence; and (ii) 
Identify what the offence was and how it is 
alleged that the U AV was used. 
In other words, we need to recover artifacts 
to support the elements of proof, and thus focus 
our forensic investigation accordingly. For 
example, if it was alleged that a drone was used 
during a voyeurism offence, then the drone's 
video footage, etc may be more useful evidence 
than flight logs. 
Step 4 - Photographs 
During any digital examination, 
photographs should be taken. These 
photographs may help to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the exhibit was in the 
condition described during the notes. Device 
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images should be taken which present the 
following: 
Exhibit within the tamperproof container. 
The tamperproof container, including 
exhibit reference, unique seal number, etc. 
Exhibit out of the tamperproof container. 
Exhibit from all possible angles. 
Any markings or serial numbers. 
Any obvious modification. 
Any damage(s). 
BIOS, if possible ( and this can be performed 
later during examination, when data storage 
media has been removed). 
Load carrying mechanism, if applicable. 
Defensive/ offensive capability, if applicable. 
During the examination, the device BIOS 
data may be obtained. When images are taken, 
these should also contain a digital radio clock 
with the current date and time. Photographs 
should be taken to accurately portray any load 
carrying mechanism ( where one can be 
identified). Also, if defensive or offensive 
capability has been identified, then 
consideration should be given to the safety of 
the examiner and sufficient precautions be made 
to prevent any injury. The list of photographs 
which should be taken is not exhaustive. In 
principle, photographs should be taken of any 
relevant aspect of the exhibit that may prove 
evidential, either in supporting or refuting the 
supporting evidential material or assumptions. 
Step 5 - Identify the make and model 
At this step, identification should be via a 
visual inspection, taking into account markings, 
designs and patterns, and cross referencing. 
Such identification can be facilitated through 
experience and open source researching. 
Identification can help the investigation in a 
number of different ways. If the device has a 
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high value, then consideration should be given 
to whether or not it is a stolen device. 
Using local law enforcement resources, it 
may be possible to create a short list of recent 
thefts and burglaries where a U AV was stolen. 
Should a suspect already have been identified 
for the theft , then this may present investigative 
avenues to help identify the UAV operator. 
Whilst this step is not entirely unique to 
U AV forensics , it is likely to be far more 
common. Computers and mobile devices are 
usually seized from an address or individual, 
however U AV s are more likely to be seized when 
the operator is not nearby or at a crime scene, 
as such attribution becomes more difficult. 
Step 6 - Open source investigation to 
identify device characteristics, potential data 
storage locations, and available forensic/ non-
forensic tools 
Device characteristics: Identify if a device is 
genuine or a counterfeit by identifying the 
markings, light locations and any other 
significant feature(s) and comparing such 
information against the specifications of the 
product as listed on the manufacture website. 
Potential data storage locations: Whilst 
some memory card locations will be clearly 
marked and easily accessible, some may not. 
Some devices have removable storage, whilst 
others may have inbuilt flash memory. 
Understanding the potential locations for data 
storage will allow one to plan the forensic 
examination and reduce the possibility of 
missing evidence. 
Available forensic / non-forensic tools: Many 
of the analysis tools which will be used, will 
likely have been created by drone enthusiasts. 
There are currently only a few U AV-specific 
commercial forensic tools available ( e.g. 
Cellebrite and MSAB); however, their portfolio 
of models catered for is limited. 
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This step is not entirely unique to U AV 
forensics but given the limited forensic literature 
available in this field, it is a key feature. 
There is no standard location or format for 
U AV flight data, and research is necessary to 
prevent missing evidence or misinterpreting 
extracted data. 
Step 7 - Identify capabilities (Video/ Audio 
recording, carrying capacity and technique) 
The following two steps are arguably the 
first stages which are entirely unique to U AV 
forensics , when compared to other forms of 
digital forensics. The reason being that, for 
example, most commercially available U AV s are 
not designed to carry payloads and release 
them. Commercially sold UAVs are 'currently' 
not designed to hold a firearm or offensive 
weapon. 
Since U AV investigations will likely be 
related to a criminal offence, it becomes more 
crucial to determine how the U AV was used and 
what (if anything) was adapted to allow the 
U AV to carry out the offence. 
It is unlikely that one would detail and 
highlight modifications to a desktop computer 
or a mobile device, since neither are historically 
used beyond what they were designed to do. 
In this step, investigators aim to answer the 
following questions: 
Does the device have a video capture 
facility (see Figure la)? 
Does the device have an audio capture 
facility? 
Does the device have a load carrying 
capacity ( see Figure 1 b)? 
Does the device have an offensive 
capability (see Figure le)? 
Does the device have a defensive 
capability? 
It is recommended that one conducts a 
visual examination of the device and takes note 
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of each of its capabilities, as well as taking 
photographs where appropriate. Where 
offensive or counter-offensive capabilities are 
noted, consideration must be given to minimise 
health and safety risks to the examiner, and 
appropriate safeguards should be put in place. 
A criminal investigation can change direction, 
based on new information uncovered. 
Step 8 - Identify potential modifications. 
The standard drone specifications 
( depending on the drone) are sufficient for the 
task they were designed to complete. The use of 
U AV s in the commission of some criminal 
offences may require modifications to the UAVs, 
as previously discussed. 
Thus, identifying such modifications will 
help support an investigation to either confirm 
or refute the alleged use during the offence. An 
example could be the sending of items into a 
restricted area ( e.g. prison). Most standard 
drones do not have a load carrying mechanism. 
Due to flight time restrictions, the drone may 
have a non- standard battery ( to increase flight 
time). The drone may also have non-standard 
motors to reduce noise levels. 
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(a) UAV with a camera (HD camera fitted o a DJI Mn-ic Pro). 
(b) UAV load canying (lma.ge !hows a DJI Pbmtom, where a 
rod of plastic has been taped spanning the legs. A ming can 
be seen hanging do, rn, which would ha\·e held the payload). 
(c) UA with an offc11Sn-e capability (Image mows a custom-
built UAV with a 9mm pistol attached to the frame, which 
was bken fro a ,,id!!O !hol>ing the pmol firing whilst _ 
UA was airborne). 
Figure 1. Identify capabilities 
Items of interest include non-standard 
battery, non-standard motors, non-standard 
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propellers, non-standard camera, and load 
carrying device. 
Identifying the standard characteristics of a 
U AV can prove tricky, since not all 
manufactures list all of the parts present. 
Consideration should then be given to either 
contacting the manufacturer directly and/ or 
expanding the sources of information to include 
enthusiast forums and similar websites. 
Step 9 - Identify data storage locations. 
Relevant data storage locations in a U AV 
include removable memory card (SD, Micro SD, 
etc.), fixed memory card, flash memory (NAND, 
NOR, etc.) , and SIM card. 
Drone data storage locations can vary 
considerably, and in some cases, data can also 
spread over multiple locations. Some drones will 
capture media and store the original version on 
the drone, whilst also streaming a reduced 
quality version onto a storage device ( e.g. 
mobile device or the cloud). Some drones will 
have visible slots, which are designed to allow 
easy access and swapping of portable storage 
devices ( memory cards). Often these will be the 
default storage location for media. Some drone 
models will have hidden and potentially sealed 
portable storage devices ( memory cards). Often 
these will be the default locations for system 
information and potentially flight logs. 
Below are two drone models with model-
specific storage capabilities: 
The DJI Phantom 4 has two removable data 
storage locations on the drone. The first 
contains media data, whilst the second contains 
flight log data (including ancillary data such as 
motor speeds) [14]. 
The Yuneec Typhon H has one data storage 
location on the drone, which contains media 
data [15]. The flight log data is stored on the 
dedicated GCS [16]. 
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Step 10 - Identify ports 
There are a variety of different methods that 
can be utilized to enable interaction with a 
drone, and external ports appear to be the most 
common method used by manufacturers. 
External ports such as USB (2.0/ 3.0), USB-C, 
Micro USB and Lighting can potentially allow 
access to a drone's data storage, where storage 
is considered to be either flash or fixed. 
Consideration should be given to conducting 
this type of examination, as it will likely involve 
powering on the exhibit. Any examination of 
this type will require an understanding of the 
drone systems, as data will likely change. 
Should evidence be obtained, the examiner 
will need to be able to explain what data 
changed during the examination, and why the 
evidence obtained during the examination can 
be relied upon. 
Step 11 - Extract removable data storage 
mediums 
In this step, we recommend the use of non-
destructive methods. Consideration at this stage 
should be to extract only data sources that do 
not require destructive methods ( e.g. chip-off). 
Destructive methods should only be considered 
when all other methods fail. As with any 
forensic examination, notes must be made to 
identify where removable storage devices were 
taken from. These storage devices will then need 
to be sub-exhibited in accordance with the 
naming conventions stated by the examiners 
force. 
Step 12 Preserve evidence 
Clone/ forensic copy of storage medium 
This is a common practice in many digital 
forensic examinations, as such the process will 
not be explained in this document. It should be 
noted that cloning a removable storage medium 
may be beneficial when attempting to access 
data which may otherwise be unobtainable. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
 • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Forensic ... 
By way of an example, the DJI Phantom 4 
flight logs are stored in .DAT files. These are 
normally classed as 'Generic data files,' but 
unlike most file types, they do not have an 
associated software to read them. When a new 
flight log is opened, it also has the secondary 
effect of closing the previous .DAT file. The last 
flight log is not viewable until the device is 
turned on. 
By cloning the removable storage device, the 
examiner is then able to replace the memory 
card with the cloned memory card, power on the 
device; thereby, closing the final .DAT file, and 
ultimately re-examining the memory card which 
now has the last recorded flight data (last 
recorded prior to seizure). Original data has not 
been changed, but new data has now become 
viewable. 
Step 13 - Traditional interrogation of 
storage medium - use certified forensic tools 
This is a common practice in many digital 
forensic examinations. It should be noted that 
traditional forensic tools may successfully 
extract media files; however, flight logs may 
show as 'unreadable.' UAV manufacturers may 
store data in different formats , and currently 
there is no standardisation. Should any data be 
identified, consideration must be given to 
checking the data though another tool and 
confirming that it has been interpreted 
correctly. 
Step 14 - Extended interrogation of storage 
medium 
This step is somewhat unique to UAV 
forensics. Typical digital forensic analysis is 
normally conducted using commercial forensic 
tool, which will usually have a proven record for 
accuracy. Any examination using non-validated 
tools is considered a risk. However, until 
commercial forensic tools for all U AV s are 
available, we may have little choice but to rely 
on open source tools to extract data of forensic 
interest. 
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As previously discussed, the capabilities of 
such open source tools can vary significantly. In 
some cases, extracted data can provide 
significant information, whilst others may only 
provide limited data. Examples of such tools 
include DatCon (Primarily DJI) [9], DJIFix 
( carves images and videos through the 
command line) [17], st2dash [18], and 
DroneLogbook [19]. There are both advantages 
and disadvantages in the use of such tools: 
Advantages 
If the U AV stores data in a format that 
is supported by existing tools, then the 
open source tool can often interpret data 
that may not be understood using 
existing tools. 
Tool is also freely available, although 
one should note the software fair usage 
restrictions. 
Most makes and models are supported 
(with varying success). 
Disadvantages 
The data obtained is unverified, 
incomplete or corrupted. 
Tool updates are sporadic or non-
existent. 
Previously available tool may be 
removed without warning. 
Increased risk of obtaining malware. 
When considering potentially non-validated 
open source tools, validation of results will prove 
necessary [23]. 
Step 15 - Interrogation of the UA V / Drone -
Potentially using a clone of any storage medium 
identified 
In certain circumstances, it may not be 
possible to remove storage devices, such as 
embedded multimedia card ( eMMC) storage. 
Prior to conducting destructive examination 
techniques ( chip-off, etc.), consideration should 
be given to performing live examination of the 
device. 
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The most common connection is via direct 
cable and this will likely be the case for the 
immediate future. For example, advances in 
mobile technology and digital forensic tools may 
result in other remote ways of obtaining 
evidence from U AV s. One should be open and 
research for potential connection methods 
appropriate to the U AV in question. 
There may also be product specific software 
available that supports device examination; 
however, consideration should always be given 
to the validity and forensic soundness of the 
tool. 
Step 16 - Interrogation of peripheral devices: 
flight controller, mobile device, etc. 
Streaming data techniques and cloud 
storage means that data may no longer be 
stored on the physical device (beyond system 
and function files). Thus, consideration should 
also be given to ancillary devices that may be 
used to control the device and/ or store data. 
Most drones require a GCS in some form, 
which can take the form of a dedicated GCS 
(handset), mobile device (phone, tablet etc.), 
laptop, or potentially a computer that could 
input flight paths without the need for later 
remote access, which could perform autonomous 
flight. 
This step becomes more specific to U AV 
forensics , since it could be considered that 
UAVs form part of the overall exhibit , which is 
the Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). We do 
not consider a mobile device to have 
independent components, nor a computer; 
however, the media consistently refer to a UAV 
( or Drone), but never the U AS, as such this 
stage is significant . 
The examination of such devices could be 
conducted using known forensic tools 
(Cellebrite, MSAB, etc.), but this process may 
only be limited to mobile phones and tablets 
which are usually supported. Equally, 
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computers could be examined using tools such 
as EnCase or X-Ways. 
The larger issue arises if the forensic tool 
does not understand or cannot interpret the 
file( s) holding the required data. Whilst this 
guide focuses on UAV examination, steps 6, 10, 
11 , 12 and 14 would also support GCS 
examination. 
When considering GCS in the form of 
mobile phones and tablets, we also have to 
consider applications, since this would be the 
likely platform used to interact with the UAV. 
Whilst further work around peripheral devices 
would clearly support and enhance this guide, 
at this stage there are too many variables ( due 
to a lack of standardization) to include. 
Step 17 - Extract removable data storage 
mediums (Destructive) 
Destructive extraction methods such as 
chip-off should be considered a final resort for 
obtaining data from a digital storage device. 
Should this extraction method fail, the 
likelihood of obtaining useful evidence will be 
significantly reduced unless another method 
becomes available at a later date. 
From the authors' experience, it would 
appear that the preferred storage medium for 
U AV s is a micro SD card. However, if the U AV 
follows the same technological curve as mobile 
phones, this could be replaced with an eMMC. 
At that time destructive methods may become 
more likely unless the U AV / Drones being 
examined are supported by tools available at the 
time of examination. 
Step 18 - Initial review of extracted data 
Analysis largely depends on the offence 
under investigation and the elements of proof 
required. For example, image and video 
metadata may hold file creation times and 
dates, along with GPS data. Interestingly, due 
to the often-hidden location of data storage 
locations, suspects may fail to remove previous 
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data prior to committing offences. For example, 
our personal experiences have shown that often 
the first images stored on the device are images 
of the suspect playing with the device and 
learning how the recording function works. 
Flight data can also vary dramatically with 
some recording little or no data, whilst others 
will record GPS position (including altitude), 
individual motor speed, pitch and yew and a 
whole host of details and photographs. For 
example, flight logs generated through 
examinations of DJI U AV s ( using the DatCon 
analysis software) showed significant detail, 
including motor speeds and battery usage. 
Conversely, flight logs generated through 
examinations of the DJI GO application on a 
tablet ( using Cellebrite software) showed much 
less data. 
Step 19 - Interpreting and translating of 
data - Into a human readable and evidential 
format 
Digital examinations can, and often do, 
produce a significant amount of data. There are 
three main aspects to this step, which can be 
broadly categorised as data sifting, data 
confirmation and data translating: 
Data sifting is the process of reducing 
the data obtained through examination, 
to only case relevant data. 
Data confirmation is the process of 
verifying the obtained data and 
confirming its accuracy. 
Data translation is the process of 
changing often complex data sets into a 
human readable format. 
Step 20 - Report/ Statement 
A sound report can have a significant 
influence on the likelihood of a conviction 
and/ or sentencing. Specifically, a well-written 
report should focus on the facts of an 
examination and its conclusion should be an 
impartial assessment of the data obtained 
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through an examination. For example, where 
flight log data has been extracted and 
extrapolated, consideration should be given to 
providing a visual representation of the location. 
Whilst many options are available, often a 
simple mapping software will suffice. 
Consideration should also be given in relation to 
unnecessary information. 
It should also be noted that while the 
guidelines flow sequentially, each part can, or 
possibly, should be considered as independent, 
and can be conducted at any point in an 
examination as required. 
4 . A CASE STUDY 
In this section, we demonstrate how our forensic 
process presented in Section 4 can be used to 
guide the forensic investigation of a DJI 
Phantom 3 UAV (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2.DJI Phantom 3 
Since the experiment was designed to 
evaluate the process of obtaining data, rather 
than analysing the data extracted, the 
examination notes do not contain personal data 
relating to the U AV ( or where data is 
represented, it is edited). No report will be 
generated which contain flight logs. 
As this is a used case exhibit, we will skip 
the requirement for a sealed tamperproof 
property bag. There was also no recorded 
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information regarding seizure details or other 
non-digital forensic investigation ( e.g. DNA, 
fingerprints or ballistic). 
Based on our online research, we determined 
that the DJI Phantom series has a removable 
memory card within the camera, and a separate 
memory card fixed to the motherboard. The 
camera memory card usually stores media 
(images and videos), the motherboard memory 
card usually stores flight logs. Our online 
research also suggested that flight logs can be 
viewed using open source tools such as DatCon. 
We were also not concerned with gathering 
artifacts to support the elements of proof in this 
evaluation; hence, the omission of relevant 
steps. 
This study will use EnCase (Version 
7.12.01), which has been validated under 
ISO / IEC 1 7025. 
As part of our examination, we determined 
that the exhibit has the following 
characteristics: 
1. Device: 
Model - W322B (DJI Phantom 3 
Adv) 
QR code - P*****l 7***** J 
2. Battery: 
Model - PH3-4480mAh-15.2V 
3. ID / reference number - 6***********2 
4. Video capture facility - No 
5. Audio capture facility - No 
6. Load carrying capacity - Yes 
7. Offensive capability - No 
8. Defensive capability - No 
9. Is there visible damage to the device? -
Yes, one propeller is broken along with 
minor damage to the propeller arm. 
10. Based on the standard fittings ( as per 
the manufacturer's website), does 
anything appear to be missing? - Yes, 
normally there is a camera mounted on 
the base of the device; however, this 
appears to have been removed. The 
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mounting point and cables remain, 
indicating that it was once attached. 
11. Exhibit measurements: 
380mm by 380mm 
12. Identified modifications (where possible, 
when compared with factory default 
options): 
Non-standard battery - No (as 
listed on the DJI website) 
Non-standard motors - No (when 
visually compared on the DJI 
website) 
Non-standard propellers - No 
( when visually compared on the 
DJI website) 
Non-standard camera - Standard 
camera removed, no camera 
present. 
Load carrying device - What 
appears to be fishing wire, tired 
between the landing struts, with 
a large amount remaining. The 
remaining amount could be used 
to carry a payload. 
13. Identified digital storage (see Figure 3): 
External memory card - Not 
present - Normally present but 
removed with the camera. 
Internal memory card - 4GB 
SanDisk Micro SD card. 
Figure 3. UAV's digital storage 
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14. Identified Ports: 
Micro USB 
15. Peripheral devices: 
No other devices submitted. 
16. Internal 4GB Micro SD Card removed. 
17. EOl created using EnCase - Complete. 
Hashes match and this also revealed no 
bad sectors. Carving using EnCase -
Complete. EnCase used to view data 
within .DAT files. Files contain dates 
but no other legible data (see Figure 4). 
Fil e Lo g ica l Catego ry Fil e Ext Size Created 
DAT 37,584,896 W indow s 27 /11/16 23 :38:04 
DAT 143,818,752 W indow s 28/11/16 22 :33:54 
FLY097 .DAT DAT 177,045, 504 W indow s 29/11/16 01 :50:28 
FLY098 .DAT DAT 96,960, 512 W ind ow s 29/11/16 19 :33:28 
FLY099 .DAT DAT 102,9 57,056 W ind ow s 02/1 2/16 17: 57 :00 
FLY100 .DAT DAT 209,092,608 W in d ow s 02/12/16 22 :44 :04 
FLY101.DAT DAT 158,728,192 W indow s 04/12/16 15:49 :34 
FLY102 .DAT DAT 85,819,392 W in dow s 04/1 2/16 17: 57 :08 
FLY103 .DAT DAT 41,0 58,304 W ind ow s 04/12/16 23 :41 :22 
FLY104 .DAT DAT 0 W in dow s 10/1 2/16 19 :59 :56 
Figure 4 . . DAT files 
18. DatCon 2.4.0 used to interpret flight log 
data -Complete (see Figure 5) . 
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Figure 5. Interpret flight log data 
Flight log data obtained, which 
contained dates, GPS locations, etc. 
19. The final .DAT file (FLY104.DAT) 
contained dat a, but it could not be 
viewed using DatCon. Our online 
research suggested that the file was not 
closed correctly, and that the DJI 
Phantom 3 does not close a .DAT file 
until it is required to open another. 
20. EnCase was then used to clone Micro SD 
Card, and the cloned Micro SD Card 
was placed in the U AV. The U AV was 
first turned ON, and then turned OFF. 
The cloned Micro SD card was 
viewed using EnCase. The final .DAT 
file was extracted and viewed using 
DatCon successfully. All relevant dat a 
were extracted. 
Micro SD card was placed back into 
the case exhibit. 
21. After using DatCon, two files were 
created, namely: 
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FL Y104.csv contained a 
spreadsheet (Viewable in Excel) 
listing all the flight record data. 
Notably this spreadsheet 
contained GPS data, battery 
capacity and height. 
FL Y104.kml, when combined 
with Google Earth, plots the 
route of the UAV. When 
properly set up, one should be 
presented with an accurate flight 
path. 
22. The summary of data obtained after 
analysis and its relevance to an 
investigation are as follows. 
The UAV has minor damage, which 
includes damage to one of the four 
propellers. This would indicate that the 
device suffered damage on impact and 
would support the assertion that it was 
in flight immediately prior to the crash. 
The device had been modified by the 
removal of the camera and the addition 
of a load carrying mechanism. The 
removal of the camera also meant that 
the memory card (located in the camera 
mount) , which normally contains media, 
was not present. 
The removal of the camera could 
also be an indication that the user 
wished to minimise the likelihood of 
attribution or reduce weight in order to 
allow a larger payload. 
The addition of a load carrying 
mechanism indicates that the device had 
been adapted specifically to carry a 
payload. Thus, it would support the 
assertion that the device was being used 
to carry a payload prior to its crash. 
The retrieved flight logs contained 
the final flight, along with previous 
flight logs. The previous flight logs 
could contain evidentially useful 
information, which could include the 
home address of the user, along with 
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friends and associates. Previous flight 
logs could also contain historical 
offenses. 
5. CONCLUSION AND 
FUTURE-WORK 
U AV s will play an increasingly important role 
in future digital (forensic) investigations, as 
such devices become more sophisticated and 
their usage become more common in our society. 
In this paper, we presented a UAV focussed 
forensic investigation process, and used it to 
guide the investigation of the DJI Phantom 3 
drone. 
Future research will include extending the 
work in this paper to forensically examine other 
UAV models and makes, and possibly obtain a 
taxonomy of forensic artifacts that can be 
recovered from such devices ( similar to the 
approach of Afzar et al. [20][21][22]). We also 
look at the possibility of adapting the proposed 
process in the vehicle forensics [27]. 
As previously discussed, one limitation m 
U AV forensics is the lack of validated 
forensically sound tools; hence, this is another 
potential research direction. For example, the 
next logical step would be to create some form 
of parsing tool that could analyse original data 
and provide a readable and reliable result. 
Besides, UAV could be integrated with radio 
communication services in the future. Hence, 
forensic acquisition and analysis of artifacts 
from radio-communication services [28] can also 
be explored. 
Finally, anti-U AV forensics is also another 
potential topic of research interest. We need to 
understand the types of activities and their 
effectiveness that may be undertaken by cyber-
criminals to counter forensic investigations. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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